ADDRESSING EMPIRICAL CHALLENGES RELATED TO THE INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY OF STATED PREFERENCE METHODS

Mikołaj Czajkowski 🞺 🛞 Wiktor Budziński 🛛 🎺 🛞

Christian A. Vossler



Aleksandra Wiśniewska



<u>Ewa Zawojska</u>

University of Warsaw, Department of Economics 🛛 🖋 继

University of Alberta, Wirth Institute

zawojska@ualberta.ca

Stated preference methods


- Used to determine <u>public's preferences</u>, especially towards non-market goods
- <u>Survey-based</u> in specially designed surveys respondents state what they would do
- <u>Flexible</u> enable valuation of hypothetical states
- Important for <u>cost-benefit analysis</u> allow to estimate the benefits

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BUT much scepticism whether survey responses reflect actual preferences

- Surveys are often (seen as) hypothetical
- Lack of economic-based incentives to answer a survey truthfully
- Empirical evidence on hypothetical bias
- Strategic voting




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How to obtain true preferences of survey respondents?



Conditions for incentive compatibility

(Carson and Groves 2007; Carson et al. 2014)

Incentive compatibility = Revealing true preferences is the respondent's optimal strategy.

- 1. Respondents <u>understand</u> and answer <u>the question</u> being asked.
- 2. The survey is seen as a <u>take-it-or-leave-it offer</u>.
- The survey involves a <u>yes-no</u> answer on a <u>single</u> project.
 (the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem)
- 4. The authority can enforce the payment (<u>coercive</u> payment).
- 5. The survey is perceived as <u>consequential</u>:
 - Respondents care about the good being valued.
 - Respondents believe that their responses will affect the finally implemented policy.

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Study design

Methodology

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Later advancements:

Results

- A sequence of questions
 Vossler et al. 2012
- Open-ended format
 Holladay and Vossler 2016

Introduction

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the role of consequentiality for stated preferences

- Studies that exogenously vary **communicated consequentiality** (defined by a researcher)
 - Manipulate the probability of a voting being binding (Carson et al. 2014; Cummings and Taylor 1998; Landry and List 2007)
 - Assign various weights to respondents' votes in determining the final action (Vossler and Evans 2009)
 - Include / exclude scripts about informing policy makers about the survey results (Meyerhoff et al. 2014; Drichoutis et al. 2015)
- Studies that control respondents' beliefs in policy consequentiality (perceived consequentiality)
 - Measured through respondents' self-reports to a direct question,
 e.g., "Do you believe that your votes will be taken into account by policy makers?"
 - Response scale:
 - Binary yes/no (Broadbent 2012)
 - Likert scale (Herriges et al. 2010; Vossler et al. 2012; Vossler et al. 2013)

EXISTING EVIDENCE ON the role of consequentiality for stated preferences

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Introduction

– Binary – yes/no (Broadbent 2012)

Literature

- Likert scale (Herriges et al. 2010; Vossler et al. 2012; Vossler et al. 2013)

A consequential context

preference revelation

fosters truthful

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Mixed evidence of the impact

Conclusions

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Results

of perceptions on truthfulness of respondents' behaviour

Our research questions

Communicated consequentiality

1) How to **design survey scripts** to induce respondents to believe in consequentiality?

"The effect of consequentiality scripts in stated preference surveys is in its infancy." (Kling, Phaneuf and Zhao 2012)

Perceived consequentiality

2) How to appropriately include measures of unobservable beliefs about consequentiality in **econometric models** of stated preferences?

We propose a Hybrid Mixed Logit model – a comprehensive framework:

- to identify effects of unobservable beliefs on stated preferences,
- whilst incorporating observable measures of these beliefs.

Study design

- Discrete Choice Experiment; CAWI; A representative sample of 1,700 citizens of Warsaw
- Public good scenario: Cheap tickets to municipal theatres in Warsaw, Poland

		Alternative B		
	Alternative A	Continuation	Attribute levels	
		of the current policy		
Entertainment theatres	No change	No change		
Drama repertory theatres	Tickets for 5 PLN	No change		
Children's theatres	No change	No change	Tickets for 5 PLN, No change	
Experimental theatres	Tickets for 5 PLN	No change		
Annual cost for you (tax)	100 PLN	o PLN	10, 20, 50, 100 PLN	
Your choice				

- 12 choice tasks per respondent
- Design optimised for Bayesian D-efficiency

- Communicated consequentiality
 - Exposition of actual consequences following from the survey
 - 4 treatments (split-sample):
 - 1-> no particular information about future consequences
 - 2 -> at the beginning the survey states that the respondents' choices might influence future policies
 - 3 —> Treatment 2 + **reminders in two more places** about possible ties to actual policy
 - 4 -> Treatment 3 + **a highlighted reminder** about potential actual consequences right before choice tasks
- Perceived consequentiality
 - A follow-up question: "Do you think that your choices in the survey will influence future decisions regarding financing municipal theatres in Warsaw?"

Methodology

Five-degree Likert scale (1 – definitely no, ..., 5 – definitely yes)

Typical for valuation surveys

Results


Conclusions

Econometric approach How to include measures of unobservable beliefs?

- Directly including stated measures of beliefs may be problematic:
 - stated beliefs are measured imprecisely; possible measurement error,
 - stated beliefs may be correlated with other unobserved factors that influence choices.
- Herriges et al. (2010) use instrumental variables to identify the impact of perceived consequentiality on preferences.
- Vossler et al. (2012) and Vossler and Watson (2013) mention binary probit instrumental variable models.
- We propose a Hybrid Mixed Logit model.

Econometric approach Hybrid Choice Model

- Incorporate perceptions, psychological factors into the random utility model
- Here, the psychological factor: beliefs about survey consequentiality
- Enable to model explicitly the effect of an experimental condition on respondents' perceptions, and the effect of the perceptions on their (observed) choices
- Avoid endogeneity




Econometric approach Hybrid Mixed Logit Model

Literature

Introduction

1. <u>Discrete choice model</u> in WTP-space with random parameters (Mixed Logit); Utility derived by consumer *n* choosing alternative *j* in choice task *t* (U_{njt}):

Research goal



Study design

Methodology

Results

Conclusions

Hybrid Mixed Logit Model

2. <u>Structural equation</u> – a linear regression

$$LV_n = \Psi' X_n^{str} + \zeta_n$$

 LV_n – the latent variable, X_n^{str} – socio-demographic variables, Ψ – a matrix of coefficients, ζ_n – error terms

3. <u>Measurement equation</u> – ordered probit

$$I_{n}^{*} = \Gamma' LV_{n} + \eta_{n}$$

$$I_{n} - \text{ an indicator of the latent variable (responses on a five-degree Likert scale), I_{n} = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ for } I_{n}^{*} < \gamma_{1} \\ 2 \text{ for } \gamma_{1} \leq I_{n}^{*} < \gamma_{2} \\ \dots \\ 5 \text{ for } \gamma_{4} \leq I_{n}^{*} \end{cases}$$

All equations are estimated simultaneously, using the simulated maximum likelihood method.

(10,000 scrambled Sobol draws)

Structural equation

Dependent variable: Belief in consequentiality (latent variable, LV)

Female	0.2992*** [0.0615]
Age	-0.0037** [0.0019]
High school degree	0.1531* [0.0896]
University degree	-0.0300 [0.0896]
Household income	0.1272*** [0.0312]
Children	0.0143 [0.0443]

 Individual socio-demographic characteristics influence latent beliefs in consequentiality.

Results

- Respondents who perceive the survey as more consequential:
 - female,
 - younger,
 - wealthier.

***, **, * - Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are given in brackets.

Measurement equation

Dependent variable: Indicator of the belief in consequentiality (self-reported)

Latent variable	0.1762*** [0.0361]	
Threshold 1	- 1.6173*** [0.0512]	
Threshold 2	-0.7364*** [0.1570]	
Threshold 3	0.6206***	
Threshold 4	[0.1575] 1.5957*** [0.1587]	

Latent beliefs in consequentiality are positively correlated with self-reported measures of the beliefs.


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
Discrete Choice Experiment (WTP-space, in PLN)

	Means	St. Dev.	Interactions with treatment	Interactions with LV
Status Quo	2.5542	43.7707***	1.0524	-6.1479***
	[1.6409]	[1.5122]	[1.4199]	[1.9452]
Entertainment theatres	32.5676***	5.4877	3.9768***	32.9290***
	[1.2731]	[4.3528]	[1.1878]	[1.8254]
Drama repertory theatres	20.8851***	11.6298***	3·4792***	18.8256***
	[1.0256]	[1.6107]	[1.0029]	[1.4931]
Children's theatres	10.5138***	15.3949***	0.4765	5.2935***
	[0.9683]	[1.2652]	[0.9424]	[1.4564]
Experimental theatres	9.7442***	16.0875***	-0.1184	10.7760***
	[0.9634]	[1.2660]	[0.9146]	[1.4881]
Cost	2.1776***	1.0708***	-0.1678***	-0.5728***
	[0.0670]	[0.0702]	[0.0453]	[0.0783]


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
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


Introduction Literature Research goal Study design Methodology Results Conclusions
Influence of communicated consequentiality on WTP
Status Quo Entertainment Theatres Drama Theatres






0.14



Beliefs over consequentiality may largely be "homegrown"; little room for the researcher to significantly influence them.





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
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Robustness of our results Other model specifications

Model modification	Results
Levels of <u>communicated consequentiality</u> as independent interactions in the discrete choice part (<u>dummy variables</u> instead of a continuous variable)	Results do not change.
<u>Communicated consequentiality</u> as an explanatory variable(s) <u>in the structural equation</u> , instead of interactions with the attributes	Communicated consequentiality strengthens latent beliefs, and indirectly, through latent beliefs, increases WTP.
<u>Communicated consequentiality</u> as an explanatory variable(s) <u>in the measurement equation</u>	 Communicated consequentiality do not explain the differences in the self-reported consequentiality beliefs. The survey scripts do not affect the stated beliefs. The Likert-scale question may not capture the latent beliefs.
No variables in the structural equation	 Results do not change. Socio-demographic characteristics are not the drivers of the found relationships.

Conclusions

- Latent consequentiality beliefs have a significant effect on WTP.
- Communicated consequentiality significantly influences WTP.
- Communicated consequentiality has no significant effect on perceived consequentiality
 - Need to develop other / more precise follow-up questions?
 - Need to develop more convincing consequentiality scripts?
- Overall, we propose the econometric framework for the analysis of links between:
 - perceived consequentiality,
 - communicated consequentiality,
 - respondents' preferences,
 - their socio-demographic characteristics.

The importance of the theoretical assumption on survey consequentiality is empirically confirmed.

<u>Ewa Zawojska</u>

University of Warsaw, Department of Economics 🛛 🧩 🅮 ALBERTA

University of Alberta, Wirth Institute



zawojska@ualberta.ca